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Abstract—The growth of misinformation technology necessi-
tates the need to identify fake videos. One approach to preventing
the consumption of these fake videos is provenance which allows
the user to authenticate media content to its original source.
This research designs and investigates the use of provenance
indicators to help users identify fake videos. We first interview
users regarding their experiences with different misinformation
modes (text, image, video) to guide the design of indicators within
users’ existing perspectives. Then, we conduct a participatory
design study to develop and design fake video indicators. Finally,
we evaluate participant-designed indicators via both expert eval-
uations and quantitative surveys with a large group of end-users.
Our results provide concrete design guidelines for the emerging
issue of fake videos. Our findings also raise concerns regarding
users’ tendency to overgeneralize from misinformation warning
messages, suggesting the need for further research on warning
design in the ongoing fight against misinformation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of misinformation has been troubling academics
and industry experts alike. Misinformation is associated with
increasing political polarization and societal divisiveness and
is considered by many as one of the most important problems
currently threatening society [1]. Even though propaganda and
misinformation have existed long before the Internet, online
technologies have accelerated and exacerbated the spread of
such content [2].
While the vast majority of prior academic research and
industry interventions have focused on text-based misinforma-
tion, increasing concern is being raised about broader modes
of fake media, including video, images and audio, that have
either been subtly manipulated or generated entirely from
scratch. Fake media broadly encompasses deep fakes, shallow
fakes, and classic signal processing methods. Deep fakes are
generated using deep learning algorithms [3], while the more
prevalent shallow fakes rely on much simpler approaches such
as photoshopping images or dropping video frames [4]. Signal
processing methods can also be used to create new or alter
existing media and can either used alone or in conjunction
with deep fake algorithms [5] to create fake media. Such fake
video media has been shown to be both extremely convincing
and very difficult for people to detect in the wild, far more so
than text-based media [6].
Four primary methods have been proposed to help identify
and prevent users from falling for fake video and image
content [7]:
• Education: Programs which focus on educating users about
the problem of fake media and how to identify it [8].
• Manual Investigation: Careful training of media forensic
analysts and journalists to identify and prevent the
publication of fake media [9].
• Automated Detection: Algorithmic-based (e.g., deep learn-
ing methods) detection of fake media [6], [10]–[16].
• Provenance-Based Authentication: Systems that allow
for cryptographically authenticating media content to its
original source such as a newspaper or broadcaster [17]–
[21].
While exciting progress is being made toward automatically
detecting and removing deep fake media, such approaches are
far from ready to be released at Internet-scale [6]. Thus, the
human must remain in the loop to interpret signals regarding
the authenticity of video media content. A key question
remains: how should we go about communicating to users
the authenticity of the media to which they are exposed? While
prior work in industry has explored how to communicate
the authenticity of images [22], for example by providing
information about when and where the image was taken, no
prior academic work to our knowledge has examined how to
communicate the authenticity of video media to end-users.
In this work, we conduct a four-part, mixed-methods study
as a first step toward understanding users’ perceptions of fake
media and developing user experience (UX) best practices to
combat it. First, to gain context on people’s existing mental
models around different modes of fake media, we conduct
a semi-structured interview study with 24 Americans from
diverse sociodemographic backgrounds in which we probe
participants concerns with media – including image and video
media as well as text media – as well as their existing strategies
for evaluating the truthfulness and authenticity of content. We
find that users rely heavily on the source of video and image
content in order to evaluate it, far more so than for text-based
information. We thus focus on source-related misinformation
indicators. Further, provenance systems – which can inform
the user whether a piece of content has been transmitted by or
derived from the original source – are the closest to being ready
for widespread implementation and can provide concrete labels
of media authenticity (vs. detection systems which provide a
probability of authenticity, see Section II-A for more detail).
Thus, we focus our remaining design steps on designing source
authenticity (i.e., provenance) indicators for video media in
order to align with users’ existing mental models and best
practice in industry. In the discussion, we review the ways in
which our work can generalize to future work using automated
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detection mechanisms.
Thus, second, situated in the context gained from our
interview study, we conducted a series of participatory design
studies with 19 Americans, again from diverse backgrounds,
to develop a set of potential UX indicators for alerting users to
the provenance of video content. Third, we refined these UX
indicators through a series of expert reviews with five academic
and journalistic experts from major news organizations and
top academic institutions. Fourth, we quantitatively evaluate
(n=1,456) a final set of proposed UX indicators (Figure 1
shows those that were found to be most effective), which were
developed through participatory design and expert feedback.
In this work, we make the following contributions:
1) Differences in Misinformation Detection. To our knowl-
edge, we are the first to identify the differences in tech-
niques that news consumers use to detect misinformation
for different media types (text, image, video).
2) User-Centered Provenance Warning Design Guide-
lines. Due to the nuances related to provenance warnings
for videos, users and experts heavily emphasized the
need for brevity, specificity, and simplicity through their
feedback and suggested designs.
3) Over-generalization of Warnings. Our quantitative sur-
vey results suggest that users often overgeneralize the
meaning of misinformation warnings.
Our results offer implications for future research on misinfor-
mation, suggest concrete designs and guidelines for warnings
of video authenticity, and raise concerns around how users
may overgeneralize in their interpretations of misinformation
warnings.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly review prior work on detecting deep
fakes, on users’ perceptions of media information, and on the
design of warnings for misinformation and related technology
applications.
A. Deep Fakes and Detection
A face swap is one type of deep fake video where the face
of someone in the original video is replaced with the face of a
targeted person in the fake video using artificial intelligence [5],
[12]. Although this technology is often used by social media
users to create unique images and videos, this technology has
also been used to create fake sexually explicit videos and has
the potential to be used for other malicious activities. Due to
this, researchers have begun to create deep fake video detection
software that determines authenticity based on blinking [10],
face warping artifacts [11], and other techniques [12]–[16].
However, the state-of-the-art fake video detection systems
are at best able to detect when content is authentic – for
example through provenance-based approaches [17]–[21] –
rather than when content is manipulated. Thus, we focus our
design studies on developing indicators of authenticity rather
than manipulation, as described in Section IV.
B. User Perceptions of Media
Prior work has found that people may use multiple heuris-
tics to identify misinformation. Multiple studies have found
evidence that the source of the information is one such
heuristic. This heuristic includes the reader’s perception of the
trustworthiness of the source itself [23], [24], the appearance
of the website on which the information is shown [25], and
whether the information confirms or aligns with what the reader
already believes [26], [27]. In addition to looking at the source’s
appearance, the bias in reporting, and alignment with current
beliefs, readers also look to see if other sources report the same
information or if the information is believed by others [28].
On social media, readers also have additional context that
prior work finds they leverage to inform their media perceptions.
Specifically, the Media Insight Project found that the credibility
of information posted on social media is influenced by who
posts the information [29]. This is corroborated by other studies
that found that Twitter users rely on the profile picture, name,
bio, and the expertise of the person that posted the content
to determine the validity of content [30]–[32]. Also, similar
to previous work on online news in general [26], Alcott et
al. [33] found that people were more likely to believe “fake
news” stories on social media that favored the candidate they
liked during the 2016 election.
Prior work by Sundar et al. proposes a theoretical framework
for understanding end-user perceptions of fake news consisting
of four cues - Modality, Agency, Interactivity, and Navigability
- that users rely on to determine the credibility of the
information [34]. The first is Modality cues, where credibility is
determined based on the structure of the medium providing the
content. The second is Agency cues where credibility is based
on the source of the information. The third is interactivity cues,
where the actions one can take with the information is linked
to credibility. The last is navigability where the user’s ability
to navigate the website of information impacts credibility.
Finally, a limited body of prior work has explored these
questions with participants in other countries, largely finding
similar results. Similar to the findings of Wagner et al. in the
U.S. [23], Wasserman and Madrid-Morales [35], [36], who
surveyed adults in Kenya and Nigeria, found that participants
had a low level of trust in the media and believed they received a
high amount of misinformation. Valenzuela et al. [37] surveyed
residents in Chile and found that those who were politically
engaged were more likely to share misinformation. Duffy et
al. [38] interviewed Singaporeans and found that people did not
always know when they received fake news, but were open to
sharing information if it appeared to be something that would
benefit others. On the other hand, the emergence of fake news
has made them more cautious about sharing and believing
everything they read. Tandoc [39] interviewed college students
in Singapore who rated their Facebook friends as more credible
than a news source. However, when motivation was high, the
opposite behavior was exhibited and students rated the news
source as more credible than their Facebook friends.
Thus far, research has shown that people’s perceptions of the
(a) CLB:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed" and a
green border.
(b) UcSB:This warning uses the signal word "unconfirmed" and
a red border.
(c) CLC:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed" and a
green check mark icon. (d) UcSO: This warning uses the signal word "unconfirmed and
an orange exclamation mark.
Fig. 1: The four most effective warning designs developed in this research. The full set of designs are shown in Appendix C in
Figures 9, 10, and 11.
trustworthiness of media are influenced by their existing beliefs
and the source of the media – where source encompasses both
elements of the news publisher, the UX of the news itself, and
who shared the news. However, all of this prior work of end-user
perceptions of media has either not explicitly addressed media
mode (e.g., text vs. image vs. video) or have focused specifically
on text media [32]. Given that participants may reasonably
engage with different types of misinformation in different ways,
and due to the growth of video misinformation especially, our
interview study explicitly focuses on user experiences with
different modes of misinformation. Additionally, prior work
has focused exclusively on the truthfulness or trustworthiness
of the content rather than provenance, e.g., whether the content
itself was manipulated, despite the fact that provenance is
among the most technically feasible methods for detecting fake
news. Thus, in this work we explicitly explore provenance.
C. UX Indicators for Misinformation
Prior work in HCI and the social sciences has focused
on methods for: actively dissuading end-users from engaging
with misinformation typically using warnings [40]–[47] but
occasionally also via games and other educational methods [48];
identifying which content should be fact-checked [42], [49]–
[52]; and correcting inaccurate beliefs [53], [54]. We focus on
the first body of related work as it is most relevant to the work
presented here.
The majority of prior work suggests that fact-check warnings
can lead to small but significant improvements in the accuracy
of users beliefs [41]–[44], [47], [55], [56]. The literature finds
that misinformation warnings are most effective when they
are immediate [41], [45] (e.g., at the time of first exposure to
the information)1, presented in context (e.g., in close visual
proximity to the content) [41], and are specific [43], [44], [56]
1Earlier prior work argues that immediate correction may, however, increase
the risk of backfire effects [46].
(e.g., indicate to the user exactly what is problematic about
the content).
Fact-checking is an art of persuasion: fact-checks are typi-
cally conducted on politicized content and thus misinformation
warnings or direct efforts to correct incorrect beliefs risk back-
fire effects in which the attempt to correct may lead to users’
strengthening their belief in misinformation [46], [57]–[59].
While the vast majority of prior work on user perceptions
of misinformation and credibility cues have focused on text
content, a small body of prior work has focused on image media.
The New York Times’ News Provenance Project investigated
ways to provide the context of photos and ensure the context
remains with a photo as it is shared across the internet [22].
After interviewing 34 individuals with various political leanings
about their media needs, their results suggested that users want
the context in a simple way so they can form their own opinion.
The researchers propose using blockchain technology to provide
users with the image source, location, date published, and a
short summary on what the photo captures.
No prior work, to our knowledge, has explicitly considered
the design of indicators for provenance and especially prove-
nance of video content. Our work takes a first step toward
filling this gap.
D. UX for Warnings
The user experience literature also discusses the use of
indicators to guide user behavior outside of the misinformation
domain. For example, researchers in the usable security commu-
nity have reviewed the use of warnings for browsers [60]–[70],
apps [71]–[73], and physical spaces [74], [75]. Research-based
guidelines for warning designs encourage removing visual
clutter to improve warning detection, including consequences
for non-compliance, use of a signal word, and clearly stating
the hazard [76]. Investigations into the effectiveness of SSL
warnings, which alert users when websites may not be as
they appear or when their connection is unsecured, also found
that hiding technical details [77] and providing clear default
choices [65] reduce the chances that readers simply click
through the warning without reading it [78], [79].
III. INTERVIEW STUDY: USER EXPERIENCES WITH
DIFFERENT MODES OF MISINFORMATION
In June 2020, we conducted 24 semi-structured interviews
with Americans from diverse sociodemographic backgrounds
to understand their experiences with text, image, and video
misinformation. These interviews provide context in which we
situate our design studies (Section IV). As aforementioned, little
prior work has investigated experiences with image and video
misinformation and thus it was necessary for us to conduct
our own contextual investigation.
In this section, we review our methods and the results of our
interviews; limitations of all studies are discussed in Section VI.
All methods were approved by our institution’s ethics review
board.
A. Methods
Our interviews were conducted via telephone or video
conference due to COVID-19 restrictions. Interviews lasted
for approximately 60 minutes, and all participants were
compensated with $20 Amazon gift cards for their participation.
1) Interview Protocol: Our interview protocol was organized
into four sections. The first three sections covered participants’
experiences with text, image, and video media, respectively.
Each of these sections probed whether participants have ever
had concerns about the truthfulness, accuracy or credibility
of the text, image, or video information they receive. The
interview probed what particular information they were most
concerned about and what their concerns were, as well as
how they went about assuaging those concerns (e.g., how
they evaluated information) including asking the participant
to walk through a concrete example of how they evaluated
information, if they did so. The interview evaluated whether
the participant had particular sources that they always or never
trusted, their perceptions of information they saw on social
media in particular, as well as whether they had concerns
about non-news information (e.g., health or entertainment
information). The interview also probed whether the participant
had ever had any negative information experiences (e.g., falling
for a piece of misinformation or manipulated media).
Finally, the fourth section of the interview asked whether
there was anything that the participants’ trusted sources could
do that would lead to the participant no longer trusting them
and whether the participants’ approach towards text, video
and/or image news had changed in the past 10 years.
We refined our interview protocol for clarity through a
pilot session attended by two researchers in addition to the
interviewer before proceeding with our interviews.
2) Recruitment: We aimed to recruit a demographically di-
verse set of participants whose demographics roughly matched
those of the U.S. population. To do so we used two methods:
we quota sampled 300 responses to a recruitment screening
survey that collected respondents’ demographics through the
survey firm Cint, ensuring that we received a survey sample
that was representative of U.S. demographics on age, gender,
education, income, race, and geographic region. Respondents
were compensated according to their agreement with Cint. We
then contacted survey respondents who indicated interest in our
full interview on this survey, attempting to balance participant
demographics as we scheduled and interviewed respondents.
Through this process, we found that younger respondents,
those under 30 years of age, were less likely to respond to our
requests to schedule an interview, despite initially indicating
interest. Thus, to ensure a balanced interview population we
posted an advertisement on Craigslist in our city of residence2
using the same screening questionnaire to recruit interview
participants and balance diversify our participant pool. See
Table III in Appendix A for the final demographics of our
participants.
2Craigslist only allows one advertisement for one study to be posted, and
thus we could not recruit in multiple cities.
3) Analysis: We analyzed our interview findings through
open-coding [80]. Three researchers examined a randomly
selected 20% (5) of the interview transcripts to independently
develop a codebook. The researchers then met to reach
agreement on a final codebook. Two of the researchers then
coded a newly selected 20% of the interview transcripts and
achieved κ=.67. Given this “substantial” agreement [81], and
in line with prior work [82], one researcher proceeded to code
the remainder of the transcripts (including the original five
used for codebook creation).
Consistent with our qualitative methods and best practice
guidelines for qualitative research, we report our results purely
qualitatively – describing whether most, many, some, or a few
– participants reported a particular code [83], [84].
4) Quantitative followup: In order to supplement this quali-
tative lens and more broadly evaluate awareness of provenance
issues (e.g., deep fakes, manipulated images), we conducted a
brief follow up survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=3,552)3
to ask a larger number of participants about: whether they had
ever heard of a “deep fake” video (and if so, how they would
define that term and whether they had seen one) and whether
they had ever heard of (and if so, ever used) reverse image
search. We also included a final question “Your answer to
this question will not affect your compensation. Did you do
an online search (such as using Google) to help answer the
questions we just asked you?” See Section VI for a discussion
of the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers. We
analyzed our data through descriptive statistics and report our
results below.
B. Results
In this section we report on the results of our interview study
and follow up survey. These results provide (a) a context in
which to situate the design of our indicators, and (b) the first, to
our knowledge, comparative investigation of users’ perceptions
and experiences with different modes of misinformation: video
vs. image vs. text.
1) The role of provenance in various media types: Most
participants mentioned various fact-checking methodologies
reported in prior work [25], [28] such as triangulation (i.e.,
checking whether multiple sources showed the same informa-
tion), using their perception of the information source, and
using their intuition regarding the validity of the content itself.
However, our work is the first, to our knowledge, to identify
that participants rely on a different set of methods for each
media type. To evaluate text media, most participants used
triangulation, source and intuition; while context, intuition
and triangulation were used by those who had a method for
image evaluation. While few participants had an established
method for evaluating video media, those who did relied on
triangulation and source. For example, the following statements
3Survey and all procedures discussed in this paper were IRB approved.
Crowd workers were paid $0.30 for the 2 minute survey task to ensure at least
$8/hr hourly wage. The participant demographics can be found in Table IV in
Appendix A.
are from two participants when asked how they evaluate text
and video, respectively:
“The first thing I do is look at the source, the URL
and who the author is, that kind of thing. And if that
checks out then I’ll probably look on something like
Reddit which is like a crowd source tool, which you
can have people chime in and say, they’re listening
about it, and whether they think it’s true or not. So I
think the combination of looking at the source of the
article. I think I can get a better picture of whether
it’s correct or not.” -P15 (Male, 20s)
“Obviously I’ll supplement [the video] with the actual
articles or see if anyone else posted other videos. I
can go around the Internet and see, "Oh, does anyone
have a different angle of this, or does anyone have
any other... ? Maybe three people video recording
it," or something along those lines. I definitely try
to go back and see, is there something I can go do
to get a better vantage point or different opinion or
something like that.” - P16 (Female, 40s)
Although all participants had a predefined process for
evaluating text content, some did not have established heuristics
for evaluating of images, and many did not have heuristics
for evaluating video because they felt these forms of media
were too difficult to evaluate. For example, one participant
responded quickly with the following when asked how they
fact-check text information.
“Google. I Google everything.” -P9 (Male, 60s)
Then, this same participant responded with the following
when asked about evaluating images.
“Yes. You can really tell if the photo’s photoshopped
if you really know there’s no way in hell that’s real.
There’s no way in hell that’s real, that’s photoshopped.
I get a chuckle out of that.” -P9 (Male, 60s)
However, they did not have a method for evaluating video.
“No. I’m not able to. The only way I could check
would be to take somebody else’s word. You un-
derstand what I’m saying? I can’t check. If you’re
going to check something, you’ve got to physically
check it. You. If you’re checking on the accuracy of
something and you’re taking somebody else’s word
for it . . . That’s somebody else’s word.”-P9 (Male,
60s)
Our quantitative results suggest that some participants’
struggle to identify heuristics for checking video or image
content may be related to a lack of awareness of manipulated
video media and standard methods for identifying manipulated
image content such as reverse image search. We surveyed 3,552
crowd workers and found that 51% of respondents had heard
of deep fake videos and only 39% had heard of reverse image
search. When asked if they had searched for answers when
completing our questions about these terms 34% of respondents
who said they heard of deep fake videos admitted to looking
up the term and 26% admitted to doing so regarding reverse
image search. Accounting for those who looked up the terms
to answer our question, 33% of participants had heard of deep
fake videos while only 30% had heard of reverse image search.
We also asked participants which media type they were most
and least concerned about containing misinformation. Although
there was no clear consensus for which type was most or least
concerning for participants, the explanations were similar. Most
participants were concerned about videos and images being
edited or taken out of context and the difficulty associated
with evaluating them. Additionally, participants viewed text as
necessary for understanding the context and easy to fact-check.
For example, participants stated the following:
“Probably [more concerned about misinformation
in]the actual text because, like I said, you can’t
believe everything you see, right?” -P19 (Male, 40s)
“I feel like a lot of people don’t necessarily want to
read, but if they’re scrolling through social media
or something, they might be more likely to watch a
video...I mean, you might still have false information
[in text], but since videos and photos can be altered
so much, I would say I’m less concerned about the
text of a news article.” -P17 (Female, 30s)
“Images are the ones I’m most concerned about, but
they just tend to be more accurate than texts articles.
I don’t know. I think that text articles are easier
to check, so even if they are inaccurate but I can
find out, whereas images I don’t know how often
they are accurate or not, just because it’s harder to
check.”-P15 (Male, 20s)
2) Use of Trusted Sources: Most participants referenced the
credibility of a source to help determine if the information
being presented was trustworthy. Most participants had a list of
trusted sources that they often referenced. For example, when
we asked a participant about their trusted news sources they
stated the following:
“Yeah, Seattle Times is a good one. New York Times.
What else? Washington Post is a good one. MSNBC,
of course, CNN. Those are all ones that I really trust
most of the time. I don’t think I’ve ever had a fake
story posted on there.” -P19 (Male, 40s)
However, most participants were unable to identify news
sources they did not trust, they were receptive to information
from sources outside their trusted list, as long as they perceived
the information as credible. For example, one participant stated
the following:
“I don’t think it’s to a point of never [trusting a
particular source]. I just read all types of different
sources, and if I find something that is a little funny
or interesting, or not believable, I just kind of look at
other places see if they’re the same, or if something
is small, I just let it go. But it’s not to a point of
never [trusting somewhere].” -P13 (Female, 20s)
3) Social Media Posts: While participants mentioned getting
a high volume of visual news information through social media,
they were very skeptical about the information they received.
Even though participants were willing to read and receive
information from unfamiliar news sources, this openness did
not extend to social media posts, unless those posts were sharing
information from a source they already explicitly trusted. For
example, three of our participants stated the following:
“I’m not very trusting [of] anything that’s shared over
social media. If a video is from a local news outlet
that I trust, then I’m more keen or more trusting on
that.” -P23 (Male, 30s)
“[On] social media, [I’m] probably the most [con-
cerned]...Because you don’t know where people are
pulling that stuff from.” -P11 (Female, 40s)
“Yeah, because I mean, I appreciate [social media] for
photographs coming from people who are at the scene
without being employed by the [news or] anything
like that, but then again you get the same question
of whether the image is correct or not. Whereas you
don’t have that doubt with the news agency.” -P15
(Male, 20s)
4) Misinformation Impact: Having experienced misinforma-
tion in various forms in the past, news consumers have adopted
questioning the authenticity of text content, as found also in
prior work [85], [86].
“I used to believe everything. Now it’s the com-
plete opposite. First, I don’t believe it unless I
verify...there’s so much stuff that’s circling around
that you don’t even know at this point. It’s like you
have to make your own judgment now. You can’t
trust anything you’re seeing.” -P8 (Male, 30s)
“Honestly, I [started checking after] the last election
and all the information that came out about whether
or not Russia had something to do with Trump
winning the election...seeing news about that is what
has made me start to really question things.” -P17
(Female, 30s)
Our results suggest that many are applying this same
scepticism to image and video media, but may not know how
to investigate this content beyond looking for obvious cues.
For example, some of our participants stated the following:
“I’ve always had videos in my life, videos that are
online or on TV and things like that. I don’t know if
that’s the case from before, but I mean, it’s always
been more of the sources that I would trust on TV,
and less of a source I would trust anywhere else, just
because it’s easy to make a video and movie editing
has always been a thing.” -P15 (Male, 20s)
“ I think I’m way more skeptical, just because
technology has changed so much. 10 or 20 years
ago, I would look at a picture and that’s what I’m
seeing, where now, I have to kind of stop and think,
is this really what I’m seeing?”-P10 (Female, 40s)
“Yeah, I think it’s pretty much the same as with
articles or images or anything like that. I want to
consider the source that the person is sharing from,
before I know whether it’s... This is going to sound
rude, but even worth my time.”-P13 (Female, 20s)
IV. DESIGN STUDY: USER-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT OF
VIDEO AUTHENTICITY INDICATORS
In July 2020, we conducted 19 participatory design sessions
with Americans from diverse sociodemographic backgrounds
to develop a set of potential UX indicators for communicating
media provenance for video content (e.g., whether the video
being shown to the user was actually from the claimed source).
We focus specifically on provenance for two reasons. First, as
described in more detail in Section II-A, the most promising
technological innovations on combating deep fakes focus
on provenance. These are the technologies beginning to be
deployed by major news organizations [87], [88], and thus
focusing on provenance has the most immediate impact. Second,
as evidenced by our interview study results, end-users already
rely heavily on the source of content, especially for image
and video media. Thus, conducting research on provenance
is in alignment with users’ pre-existing mental models and
practices.
Below, we describe our methods and the results of our
design interviews. We also describe our follow up expert design
reviews of the participatory design-produced indicators, and
the results of those reviews. All methods were approved by
our institution’s ethics review board.
A. Methods
Our participatory design sessions were conducted via video
conference due to COVID-19 restrictions. Design sessions
lasted for approximately 60 minutes, and all participants were
compensated with $20 Amazon gift cards for their participation.
1) Participatory Design Protocol: Design sessions consisted
of three parts: in the first, participants sketched notification
designs while in the second part they gave feedback on other
designs (see Figure 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix B). In the third,
participants instructed the researcher on how to create their
ideal design using PowerPoint. A subset of participant designs
are shown in Figure 8 of Appendix B.
We started the design sessions by asking participants to
“draw some messages that you think would be able to inform
someone looking at a video about whether it really came
from the original source / the source stated on the video”.
We conducted these drawing exercises in the context of a
scenario, to improve concreteness and maximize the validity of
the sketches: “Imagine you are reading an article on the Blue
Bear Times website, and you see a video associated with the
article that appears to have been created by Blue Bear Times.
Please draw what you would expect to see, if our technology
[was unable to verify/was able to verify] that the Blue Bear
Times was the source of the video/ created that video.” We
had a similar set of scenarios to prompt participant sketching
in the context of a video appearing in social media.
Fig. 2: This figure shows a screenshot of participant P7’s
unverified source warning design made using the Excalidraw
template we provided. This warning includes a yellow box
with a question mark to the left of the video. When the user
hovers over the box, a message appears that says “Unable to
verify source of video."
Participants sketched either within a drawing template that
we provided (Figure 2) using Excalidraw [89] or told us
what to sketch and watched and revised as we sketched it.4
After completing their sketches, participants evaluated a set of
potential provenance notification designs that we created based
on existing fake news notifications (see Appendix B for the
designs). To avoid desirability bias (participants softening their
feedback because they knew we created the designs), we told
participants that we were not apart of the design process but
were hired to get user feedback. For each design, we asked:
“What do you immediately notice about this warning/label?”,
“What do you like about it?”, “What do you dislike?”, and
“How can it be improved?” Finally, after participants viewed
all designs, we reviewed which designs, design elements, and
phrasings were their favorites among their own designs and
the other designs they saw.
2) Recruitment: We used the same recruitment approach
as described in Section III-A. See Table V for the final
demographics of our design study participants.
3) Analysis: We chose to do participatory design studies to
maximize inclusion of diverse perspectives in the design of
our indicators [83], [90]. In order to avoid oppressing these
perspectives [91] or reducing our sensitivity to nuances in
the participatory design data by too restrictive of a formal
coding process, we followed the best practice guidelines of
McDonald et al. [83] . To this end, we used a field notes
approach to analyze our results and reached consensus on our
findings through researcher discussion of the results rather than
open-coding with intercoder agreement.
4) Expert Design Reviews: We also conducted five expert
design reviews with experts who had major mainstream
newspaper and/or academic journalism backgrounds. We met
with each expert for 30 minutes and solicited their feedback
on the set of designs most preferred by our participants. Each
expert was compensated with a $50 Amazon gift card.
4Due to COVID19 restrictions we were unable to conduct in-person design
studies.
All reviews were attended by three members of the research
team, and the research team discussed the results of the session,
reaching consensus on the feedback. In the results section
below, we qualitatively describe the feedback provided by
these experts.
B. Results
1) Participant Designs.: Overall, participant’s designs con-
sisted of the colors red or yellow for notices about un-
authenticated media and green for notices indicating authen-
ticated media (see Appendix B). Participants used either
the phrase (un)verified or (un)known source to indicate the
authentication status of the media. Participants used either
a check mark or green block of color (for authenticated
media) and an exclamation point or red block of color (for
unauthenticated media). A few participants used interstitial
warnings or messages imposed over the video. However, the
majority of the participants’ designs included a check mark or
an exclamation point icon, as appropriate, and a phrase below
the video that included the word verified when the video was
authenticated and unverified or not verified when the video
could not be authenticated. (see Figure 3 and Appendix B).
2) Design Feedback: Participants’ discussions of their own
designs, others designs, and the design probes, as well as
experts’ feedback on participants’ designs can be summarized
into four suggestions. We discuss each suggestion below and
how it impacted the designs we chose for quantitative testing.
Include a simple and clear message. As shown in Figure 5
in Appendix B, some of the design probes included detailed
information, such as date, location and subject, as suggested by
prior work on image media [22]. Participants mentioned that
while they understood why this information could be useful,
they just wanted to read a simple phrase that was easy to
understand and would not cause them to have to pause for
more than a few seconds to read and react to the message,
so as not to interrupt their flow of consuming content. Thus,
they preferred that additional contextual information be placed
deeper in the UX, such as behind a Learn More link. For
example, one participant stated:
“I just think that [all the detailed information] would
be a bit too much.... I like the learn more [instead
of the additional information]... I’d rather just [know
that] the video [is] verified or unverified.” -P2
(Female, 30s)
“I feel like this [context about the video] almost takes
away from the content itself... That’s just a lot of
information. I would prefer something that I could
just quickly glance at to see if something is verified
or not.” -P15 (Female, 20s)
After receiving this feedback consistently from the partic-
ipants, we decided to focus on testing warnings with short
phrases that included the Learn More option. It is however
important to note that participants may be unlikely to access
the additional information, as shown by recent work examining
participants’ real practices when exploring news content on
social media [32].
Additionally, while most participants used the word verified
in their warning designs before and after seeing the design
probes, perhaps because this is standard language used in social
media for authenticated users, experts were concerned about
the use of this word. When evaluating a participant design that
contained the word unverified, Expert A stated:
"I don’t know that this is the best word choice.
It makes me want to ask... Well who says its
unverified?... unconfirmed is a little more exact"-
Expert A
We received similar feedback from the other expert reviewers
in favor of the word confirmed, which prompted us to
quantitatively test the word confirmed against the signal word
verified, which experts worried would be over interpreted:
“My main concern is that people will read too much
into it and might take it to mean too much more than
what it actually means.”-Expert C
Tell me why it is unauthenticated. Similarly, participants
wanted to be able to find information specifically about why a
video might be unverified or unconfirmed. While they did not
want this information as part of the main warning, they wanted
this information to be available if desired and suggested it be
added to some of the designs that did not have it (see Figure 6b
in Appendix B).
“Not being able to determine the source is different
from we don’t think this is a good source... I want to
be clear about the intention...Something that is not
a verifiable source is based on we don’t know the
source... Is there a learn more?... Ok, so if someone
comes across this, and they’d want to know how
come... how do you help answer that?” -P13 (Male,
Over 60)
The expert reviewers agreed that having a Learn More button
would be beneficial. They believed that participants might have
questions about the authentication process and adding the Learn
More button would allow viewers to understand the warning
better.
Be specific. In addition to keeping warnings short and clear,
but with additional context available through a Learn More
button, participants and experts wanted to ensure that warnings
were as specific as possible; supporting prior work showing
that specific warnings are more effective [43], [44], [56].
A few of the designs we showed participants announced
when a video source was confirmed but did not clearly state
the source itself (see Figure 7b in Appendix B). Participants’
responses to these design probes and some of their own designs
(see Figure 3) suggest providing explicit information regarding
the source of the video to make it clear to the reader what had
been confirmed or verified.
“So it’s saying the source of this video is known. Ok.
Why are you telling me the source of this video is
known? Like ,who is it? Like, why wouldn’t you just
say it? Like, put that in there with it.” -P19 (Female,
30s)
Fig. 3: These are screenshots of two warning designs created
by participants during the study. Additional participant created
designs can be found in Appendix B.
Our expert reviewers agreed with this sentiment and en-
couraged making the warnings highly specific. Instead of
simply saying “Verified: XYC News”, Expert B suggested
using “Verified Source: This video was published by XYC”. We
implemented a shorter version of this statement using “Verified
Source: Video published by XYC News” (see Figure 1a) and
compared this against the even shorter “Verified: XYC News”
in our quantitative tests presented in the next section.
Do not interrupt typical video viewing flow. Finally,
participants felt strongly that the warnings should not interrupt
their video viewing flow. This is in line with prior work
finding that people want to be empowered to evaluate content,
but given the autonomy to make their own choices about
what to consume [22]. Some design probes showed passive
warnings (e.g., a message below the video) while others showed
interstitial warnings that required action before the viewer could
watch the video. Although our participants understood why
these design characteristics might be necessary, they preferred
a warning that easily captures the viewer’s attention but is
easy to ignore when watching a video. Our participants did
not want to be distracted by the warning when trying to watch
their video of choice. In response to Figure 4d (Appendix B),
a participant stated the following:
“Most of these [warnings with colored borders] are
drawing way too much attention to themselves. This
brings me back to the ideas that I drew which were
unobtrusive [see Figure 2]” -P7 (Male, 20s)
Relatedly, participants wanted to avoid requiring additional
clicks to watch a video after the warning is displayed. Our
participants stated that the goal of the warnings was to notify
the user of the authenticity of the media (that it was unmodified
from the news source) and not to notify the user of anything
about the information itself. Since the information presented
could still be accurate, even though the source was not
authenticated, there is no reason to prevent users form watching
the video. For example, when we showed the design displayed
in Figure 6d (Appendix B), P5 immediately responded by
saying:
“Why are you making the customer click multiple
times?... I clicked on a video, then I read this, and
then I have to click see video... I feel annoyed because
there will be multiple time that I have to click.” -P5
(Male, 40s)
For these reasons, and since only two participants drew
interstitial warnings themselves, we do not evaluate interstitial
warnings in our expert evaluation. It is important to note that
while interstitial warnings may annoy users, they are known
from prior work in other domains to be more effective than
passive warnings [65]. However, thus far, few media platforms
have adopted such warnings (Twitter is a notable exception).
Similarly, participants gave mixed reviews to the non-
interstitial, but the highly visible design probe shown in Figure
4d (Appendix B). Participants appreciated that the design was
easy to see, but found the size and text used in the warning
disruptive. Experts, however, liked this design probe and
suggested decreasing the thickness of the border and changing
the text used (see Figure 1a) to accommodate participants’
preferences (see Figure 1a).
V. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION: EVALUATING
INTERPRETABILITY OF VIDEO AUTHENTICITY INDICATORS
To evaluate the interpretability of the warnings created
through our participatory design and expert evaluation studies,
as well as to identify the most understandable set of warnings
and/or warning design principles for video media provenance,
we conducted a quantitative evaluation of the interpretability
of a representative set of video provenance warning designs
(n=1,456). The purpose of this work is to confirm the inter-
pretability of our warnings outside of our participatory design
sample. However, the evaluation presented here is but a first
step: just because users can understand the warnings does not
necessarily mean that they will be effective at reducing the rate
at which news consumers are misled by fake videos. Future
work must be conducted to evaluate these warnings in the field.
In this section we review the methods and results from our
evaluation of these designs. All methods were approved by our
institution’s ethics review board.
A. Methods
We quantitatively evaluate a representative set of the designs
most preferred by both participants and experts. Specifically,
as most participant designs relied heavily on check mark /
exclamation point icons, and phrases underneath the video
frame, we test warnings that include these elements. As part
of these designs, we test the participant-preferred phrase
(un)verified against the expert-preferred phrase (un)confirmed.
Additionally, since experts worried that such designs would be
insufficient to draw participant’s attention and thus suggested
using a more visible warning design with a border (see Figure
TABLE I: Representative Design Combinations of Icon, Signal Word, and Message Length. * indicates designs ultimately tested
in our quantitative evaluation (see Section V-A for more detail).
Design Signal Word MessageLength Icon Phrase Used
CSC* Confirmed Short green X Confirmed Source: XYC News
CLC* Confirmed Long green X Confirmed Source: Video published by XYC News
CLB* Confirmed Long green border Confirmed Source: Video published by XYC News
UcSO* Unconfirmed Short orange ! Unconfirmed Source
UcSB* Unconfirmed Short red border Unconfirmed Source
VSC Verified Short green X Verified Source: XYC News
VSB Verified Short green border Verified Source: XYC News
VLC* Verified Long green X Verified Source: Video published by XYC News
UvSO* Unverified Short orange ! Unverified Source
UvSB Unverified Short red border Unverified Source
Possible Survey Pairs: CSC-UcSO CLC-UcSO CLB-UcSB VSC-UvSO VSB-UvSB VLC-UvSO
TABLE II: Quantitative Survey Results. All possible representative design variants are shown for symmetry with Table I but
those with – were not tested (see Section V-A)
.
Designs
Selection CSC(N=287)
CLC
(N=285)
CLB
(N=299) VSC VSB
VLC
(N=285)
UcSO
(N=285)
UcSB
(N=299)
UvSO
(N=285) UvSB
FB
(N=300)
1 26% 25% 30% – – 29% 34% 36% 34% – 31%
2 49%* 64%* 57%* – – 55%* 64%* 57%* 61%* – 47%
3 33% 38% 34% – – 38% 39% 33% 38% – 62%*
4 53% 48% 36% – – 48% 36% 33% 34% – 33%
5 17% 13% 16% – – 18% 13% 15% 19% – 17%
6 2% 1% 1% – – 1% 1% 2% 1% – 2%
7 4% 4% 4% – – 1% 2% 4% 2% – 1%
OI 16% 22% 24% – – 15% 24% 23% 22% – 23%
* = Intended answer
1 = The location and date of the video was confirmed/verified
2 = The news agency that produced the video was unconfirmed/verified
3 = This video provides (in) accurate information
4 = XYC News is (not) a trustworthy source
5 = It is recommended that I (do not) watch this video
6 = Other
7 = I don’t know
OI = Participants that only selected the intended interpretation
1a), we evaluate designs that contain borders against those
that use the participant-preferred check mark / exclamation
point icons. Finally, we also evaluate one state-of-the-art
misinformation warning message, used by Facebook [92] (see
Figure 12 in Appendix B), as a baseline for interpreting our
results.5
Each design we test is comprised of a signal word, icon,
and a phrase as shown in Table I. To avoid excessive use of
resources, we do not evaluate every single possible combination
of signal word, icon and phrase shown in Table I. Instead, we
evaluate design attributes sequentially. We first compare signal
words in designs that were otherwise identical (we used long,
5We use Facebook’s 2017 warning design as a baseline because its goal
– to raise awareness of potentially suspicious information – is closest to the
goal of our work. Facebook’s current warning design suggests related articles
for user education, rather than aiming to provide users with signal about the
present content [93].
green icon warnings for this comparison as they are most
reflective of participant designs); next, we compared length for
the most effective signal word; and finally we compared icons
for the most effective signal words and lengths. See Appendix
C for the designs ultimately tested and Table II for the results
of these tests.
1) Survey Methodology: In August 2020, we tested these
designs by distributing five surveys using MTurk 6. Four of
the surveys tested a pair of designs: one that indicated a
positively authenticated media instance and one that indicated
a non-authenticated media instance; the baseline survey tested
only Facebook’s warning, which provides no notification for
“true” content, only a warning for potentially false content.
The surveys included a digital consent form, design pair
interpretation questions, and demographic questions. The
6See Section VI for a discussion of the use of MTurk.
warnings in each pair were displayed randomly in the surveys
to eliminate order effects. The design interpretation questions
were multiple selection and asked participants to select the
options that best fit their interpretation of each warning they
were shown (see Table II for interpretation options). Based on a
power analysis, we aimed to recruit at least 250 participants per
survey, in order to observe small- to medium-sized differences
in the interpretability of the designs.
Each survey took between two and three minutes to complete
and participants were compensated $.40 to complete each one.
In order to participate, participants had to be in the United
States of America, have a 95% or higher approval rating [94],
and could only complete one of the multiple surveys we posted.
2) Participants: In total, 1,456 people participated in this
study. Additional demographic information can be found in
Table VI in Appendix C.
3) Analysis: Using a Chi-square test for homogeneity, we
compared the proportion of participants that made a particular
selection for a design to another design. As comparisons were
limited and planned, we did not apply correction [95]. All
calculations were completed using R, an open-source software
for statistical computing [96].
B. Results
The purpose of each design is to notify users that the video
source was authenticated or that it was not. Overall, we find
that when the message informed the user that the video source
was authenticated, a larger proportion of participants were able
to correctly interpret the message as intended when the message
included the signal word "confirmed", a longer more specific
phrase describing what was confirmed (the source of the video),
and a green checkmark (CLC 64%) or green border (CLB 57%)
(see Table II). When the source was not authenticated, more
participants responded correctly to the signal word unconfirmed
than unverified and responded correctly equally as often when
this signal word was paired with an exclamation point icon
(UcSO 64%) or a red border (UcSB 57%).
1) Effect of Individual Design Choices: When participants
were asked to interpret the meaning of the warning design they
viewed, they were asked to select all of the options that applied.
We tested the significant proportional differences between
designs to see how changes in design impact interpretation. In
order to do this, we compared warnings that differed in one
design choice - phrase length, signal word, and icon. Below,
we report on the effect of each design choice.
We first evaluated the effect of signal word (e.g., verified
versus confirmed) on warnings that were otherwise identical.
Comparing VLC to CLC, we find that a larger proportion
of participants selected the intended interpretation (p = 0.03)
when shown the warning with the “confirmed” phrase (CLC,
64%) than with the “verified” phrase (VLC, 55%).
When examining whether users only select the intended
interpretation of the warning, we observe that only 22% of
respondents selected only the intended interpretation for CLC
and 15% did so for VLC (a significant difference with p =
0.031). This suggests that such warnings are highly likely to
be overgeneralized (see Section V-B2 for further discussion);
however, the “confirmed” phrasing still outperforms the “ver-
ified” phrasing, confirming the concerns our experts raised
about overgeneralization from the “verified” term.
Next, we evaluated the impact of phrase length using the
“confirmed” keyword. When comparing CSC vs CLC, the longer
phrase resulted in an increase in the proportion of participants
that selected the intended interpretation (49% with CSC vs.
64% with CLC, p = 0.001). Phrase length did not have a
significant impact on the degree of overgeneralization (e.g.,
the proportion of respondents who selected only the intended
interpretation).
Finally, we compared the use of icons to colored borders by
comparing CLC to CLB and UcSO to UcSB. While we observe
no significant difference in the proportion of respondents
correctly interpreting CLC and CLB, we do observe that the use
of a border leads to better specificity in warning interpretation:
a significantly higher proportion of participants (p = 0.005)
interpreted the warning CLC warning to also mean that XYC
news, the confirmed producer of the video, was a trustworthy
source. Thus, it appears that the border design may better focus
participants’ interpretations to the specific content – the video
– highlighted by the border. We find no significant differences
in users’ interpretations of the unconfirmed warnings with a
red border vs. with an exclamation point.
2) Performance Against the Baseline & Overgeneralization:
To evaluate our warnings against the current state-of-the-art
misinformation warnings for text content, we evaluate the
interpretability of our best warning designs against Facebook’s
previously used misinformation warning (Table II). We find
that our warnings equally as interpretable as the existing state-
of-the-art (64% of respondents selecting intended interpretation
for UcSO vs. 62% for FB p > 0.05; 57% for UcSB vs.
62% for FB p > 0.05). Further, we find that participants did
not overgeneralize the meaning of the user-created warnings
significantly different than they do Facebook warnings (24% of
respondents select only the intended interpretation for UcSO
vs. 23% for FB, p > 0.05; 23% UcSB vs. 23% for FB, p >
0.05).
VI. LIMITATIONS
The qualitative portions of our work (Sections III and IV)
have limitations common to qualitative research. First, the
generalizability of our results is limited by the constraint
of the qualitative sample size. We took care to recruit a
sociodemographically diverse sample to increase the diversity
of experiences captured in our work, but it is possible that we
may have omitted an important dimension of diversity in our
recruitment and thus not included a full spectrum of participant
experiences. To partially counteract this risk, we did conduct
follow up quantitative studies both to determine the prevalence
of certain key interview results (e.g., Americans’ awareness of
deep fakes) and to validate that the designs produced through
our qualitative work were understandable to larger groups of
participants. Second, interviews rely on participants’ comfort
with sharing information with the interviewer and their ability
answer to the interviewer’s questions. It is possible that despite
our best efforts to follow best practice in our interviews and
participatory design sessions, participants did not fully share
their experiences in response to our questions.
The quantitative portions of our work are limited by the
use of MTurk for recruiting our survey participants. Further,
although we added questions to detect bots and limited
participants to one of the seven surveys, we recognize that
there are ways to circumvent these measures, and our results
could include response from bots or repeat survey participants.
Although Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers are
different from the general population in many ways, prior work
has found that, for security and privacy related issues, MTurk
workers are as representative of the experiences of Americans
under 50 as opt-in survey panels with census-quota determined
demographics [97]. Given this context, and that we took great
care to obtain diverse perspectives in our qualitative work,
we proceeded with using MTurk samples for our quantitative
confirmations. However, our results should be interpreted with
the appropriate sample limitations in mind.
Finally, as aforementioned, our quantitative evaluation eval-
uates the interpretability of our warnings but does not evaluate
the impact of our warnings on user behavior. Future work
should seek to evaluate video provenance warnings in the wild,
to understand their mitigation effect for fake video media.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our interview results confirm the findings of prior work
[25], [28] that users have multiple heuristics for combating
misinformation that have been developed over time and
exposure to such content. However, while our participants
appeared confident and were quick to discuss fact-checking
methods for text-based news articles, many were less sure of
themselves and lacked heuristics for detecting misinformation
depicted in images and videos. In sum, our interview results
suggest that there are significant differences in how people
experience and respond to text-, image-, and video-based
misinformation. Thus, future work on misinformation and its
warnings should explicitly consider the media’s type.
More specifically, some participants simply expressed that
they did not have a method for evaluating image or video
content, while others mentioned that “that they would just
know” if a video or image had been edited. However, as video
editing techniques improve, it will increasingly become more
difficult for the untrained eye to detect edited or deep fakes
videos, especially when they are presented as real from a trusted
source. Due to this, participants expressed concern about not
having the necessary context to evaluate videos and images;
with some participants even assuming all videos and images
are fake unless there is relevant text to provide the context.
Our design work takes a first step toward filling this gap,
exploring best design practices for the creation of warnings
that can provide the user with additional context regarding the
authenticity of video media.
In line with prior work [25], [26], [30], we find that source is
a particularly critical heuristic for identifying misinformation,
regardless of media mode. Thus, providing warnings that
leverage users’ existing emphasis on source by providing
information on media provenance – whether the media they are
seeing is actually unmodified content from the claimed source
– can be the first step in the right direction for combating
misinformation, especially for video content.
Such warnings must balance avoiding misleading users and
reducing user engagement with content by frustrating them
with warnings. Our design study results suggest that such
warnings should avoid interrupting users’ consumption flow
– for example, by being brief, easy to interpret, and passive
rather than interstitial – and should be highly specific (as also
suggested by prior work [56], [65], [76]).
Our quantitative evaluation finds that the most interpretable
video provenance warnings are those that use the word confirm,
along with specific details (such as what the confirmed source
of the video is). We found that either a red exclamation point
or a red border for unconfirmed videos and a green check mark
(for confirmed videos) or a green border around the video were
equally interpretable, however the use of the green check mark
may be overgeneralized as indicating that the news source is
trustworthy as well.
Best practices for future misinformation design work.
We leveraged both participatory design with end-users and
expert feedback to develop our designs. We find that while
participants’ designs reflected one of the three most effective
design elements – longer and more specific messages, it was
the experts who suggested the other two effective elements:
the use of a more specific signal word (confirmed vs. verified)
and the border design; although the ultimate design of the
latter was informed by participants’ feedback as well. Thus,
our results suggest that future work seeking to design such
warnings should conduct both participatory design with end-
users and expert evaluations to develop the most effective
warnings.
Applicability of designs beyond video provenance. In this
work, we focus on designs which indicate the authenticity of
media generated by a provenance system. When media content
can be cryptographically authenticated back to its publisher,
these provenance indicators provide a secure guarantee that the
media is authentic. On the other hand, automated fake media
detection systems produce a score, and possibly a confidence
level, that can be used to indicate the probability that the
media is “fake”. Our study results can also be applied to
fake media detection to some extent, but additional research
is required to understand the best method to convey to users
the notion of probabilistic detection of manipulated media –
rather than the binary and definitive notion of authenticated vs.
non-authenticated addressed in this work.
Watch out for misinformation warning overgeneraliza-
tion. Finally, our findings highlight a broad concern for
misinformation warnings that address any mode of media:
overgeneralization. Both our misinformation warnings and
the baseline state-of-the-art warning from Facebook, against
which we evaluated our warnings, exhibited high degrees of
overgeneralization: while a majority of respondents selected
the intended interpretation of the warning, among other
interpretations, just under a quarter selected only the intended
warning interpretation. In addition to the intended interpretation
of our warnings, users also took the warnings to mean that they
should not watch the video because, for example, the content
was inaccurate or the source was untrustworthy.
Thus, future work may seek to critically examine the
consequences of overgeneralization of misinformation warnings.
Evaluations of such warnings should take care to evaluate this
property, and warning designers should carefully consider the
impact they want to have with the warnings they provide given
users tendency to generalize past the intended effect of the
warning.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted a four-part, mixed methods
study to investigate Americans’ experiences with video mis-
information and design warnings to counteract such content.
We conducted an interview study with 24 diverse Americans,
identifying that the availability of heuristics through which
users can identify misinformation and their confidence in
applying those heuristics varies by media mode (text vs. image
vs. video) and identifying that trust in the source of the
information is a unifying misinformation heuristic across media
modes.
Building on users’ existing use of information source and
the emerging viability of technical systems for verifying the
provenance (authenticity) of video source as a promising way of
combating fake media content, we develop warnings and design
guidelines for communicating the provenance of video content
to end-users. To this end, we conducted participatory design
studies with 19 diverse Americans to develop and qualitatively
evaluate designs for warnings to alert users to the authenticity
of video media content. We further evaluated these warnings
through expert design reviews and larger-scale quantitative
evaluations with crowd workers. We find that a combination
of user and expert insights are necessary to define the most
interpretable warnings, and raise concerns around the potential
for users to overgeneralize misinformation warnings regarding
video or even text information. Our results offer concrete
insights for misinformation warning designers and suggest
multiple directions for future research.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW DEMOGRAPHICS
In this appendix, we describe the demographics of the
participants of the two parts of our interview study. Table
III provides the demographics of the interview participants.
The demographics of the MTurk participants who answered
questions regarding their knowledge of deep fake videos and
reverse image search via a survey are displayed in Table IV.
TABLE III: Demographics for Interview Participants
Demographics Participants
(N=24) n %
Gender
Female 13 54%
Male 11 46%
Non-binary 0 0%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Age
18-30 4 17%
31-40 9 38%
41-50 5 21%
Over 50 6 25%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Race
White 12 50%
Hispanic or Latino 1 4%
Black or African American 3 13%
Native American 1 4%
Asian 5 21%
Other 2 8%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Education
No college 1 4%
Some college but no degree 5 21%
Associate’s degree 5 21%
Bachelor’s degree 9 38%
Advanced degree 4 17%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Employment
Employed 11 46%
Self-employed 4 17%
Not working 5 21%
A homemaker 3 13%
A student 1 4%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Income
Less than $30,000 4 17%
$30,000 to under $65,000 6 25%
$65,000 or more 13 54%
Prefer not to answer 1 4%
TABLE IV: Deep Fake Survey Demographics
Demographics Participants
(N=3,552) n %
Gender
Female 1488 42%
Male 2048 58%
Non-binary 10 0%
Prefer not to answer 6 0%
Age
18-30 1229 35%
31-40 1182 33%
41-50 632 18%
Over 50 498 14%
Prefer not to answer 11 0%
Race
White 2447 69%
Hispanic or Latino 160 5%
Black or African American 706 20%
Native American or American Indian 99 3%
Asian 231 7%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 5 0%
Other 8 0%
Prefer not to answer 11 0%
Education
No college experience 189 5%
Some college but no degree 307 9%
Associate’s degree 228 6%
Bachelor’s degree 2153 61%
Advanced degree 666 19%
Prefer not to answer 9 0%
Employment
Employed 2622 74%
Self-employed 528 15%
Out of work 204 6%
A homemaker 87 2%
A student 66 2%
Prefer not to answer 22 1%
Income
Less than $30,000 791 22%
$30,000 to under $40,000 433 12%
$40,000 to under $50,000 598 17%
$50,000 to under $80,000 1066 30%
$80,000 or more 664 19%
Prefer not to answer 42 1%
APPENDIX B
PARTICIPATORY DESIGN PROBES
This appendix provides the design probes used in the
participatory design study. Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 depict the
screenshots of these design probes. Figure 8 displays a subset
of the notification designs created by participants. Finally,
Table V displays the demographics of the participants from
this study.
TABLE V: Demographics for Participatory Design Study
Demographics Participants
(N=19) n %
Gender
Female 10 53%
Male 9 47%
Non-binary 0 0%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Age
18-30 5 26%
31-40 7 37%
41-50 1 5%
Over 50 6 32%
Education
No college 0 0%
Some college but no degree 4 21%
Associate’s degree 2 11%
Bachelor’s degree 10 53%
Advanced degree 3 16%
Race
White 7 37%
Hispanic or Latino 1 5%
Black or African American 5 26%
Native American 1 5%
Asian 4 21%
Other 2 11%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Employment
Employed 10 53%
Self-employed 2 11%
Not working 5 26%
A student 2 11%
A homemaker 0 0%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
Income
Less than $30,000 3 16%
$30,000 to under $65,000 7 37%
$65,000 or more 9 47%
Prefer not to answer 0 0%
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4: Warning designs inspired by Slate’s fake news detector browser extension [98]
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 5: Warning designs inspired by the News Provenance Project [22]
(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6: Warning design inspired by current Twitter warnings [99]
(a) Warning design inspired by Facebook warning discontinued
in 2017 [92] (b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 7: This figure includes four warning design probes where the warning information is below the video
Fig. 8: Subset of Participant Warning Designs
APPENDIX C
QUANTITATIVE STUDY
We next provide details of the quantitative study. Figure
12 9, 10, and 11 display screenshots of the designs that
were created based on participant and expert feedback.
Table VI indicates the demographics of the participants from
the quantitative study where participants interpreted the designs.
TABLE VI: Quantitative Study Demographics
Demographics Participants
(N=1,456) n %
Gender
Female 588 40%
Male 863 59%
Non-binary 1 <1%
Prefer not to answer 4 <1%
Age
18-30 540 37%
31-40 481 33%
41-50 243 17%
Over 50 187 13%
Prefer not to answer 5 <1%
Race
White 1049 72%
Hispanic or Latino 58 4%
Black or African American 243 17%
Native American or American Indian 48 3%
Asian 100 7%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 3 <1%
Other 5 <1%
Prefer not to answer 6 <1%
Education
No college 90 6%
Some college but no degree 118 8%
Associate’s degree 86 6%
Bachelor’s degree 908 62%
Advanced degree 250 17%
Prefer not to answer 4 <1%
Employment
Employed 1086 75%
Self-employed 234 16%
Not working 75 5%
A homemaker 32 2%
A student 22 2%
Prefer not to answer 7 <1%
Income
Less than $30,000 324 22%
$30,000 to under $40,000 678 47%
$65,000 or More 445 31%
Prefer not to answer 9 1%
(a) CLB:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed" and a
green border.
(b) UcSB:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed" and a
red border.
(c) vsc:This warning uses the signal word "verified" and a green
border.
(d) UvSB:This warning uses the signal word "verified" and a
red border.
Fig. 9: This figure shows the four designs we tested that have a border around the video instead of an icon.
(a) VSC:This warning uses the signal word "verified" and a
green check mark.
(b) CSC:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed" and a
green check mark.
(c) VLC:This warning uses the signal word "verified", longer
phrase and a green check mark.
(d) CLC:This warning uses the signal word "confirmed", longer
phrase and a green check mark.
Fig. 10: This figure shows the four designs that included the green check mark in their design to alert users that the source was
validated.
(a) UvSo:This warning uses the signal word "unconfirmed", short
phrase and an exclamation point
(b) UcSo:This warning uses the signal word "unconfirmed", short
phrase and an exclamation point
Fig. 11: This figure displays the two designs that use the exclamation point icon in the warning to alert users that source was
not validated.
Fig. 12: Facebook Misinformation Warning from 2017
